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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Geirrod Oetloph Stark appeals from the district court's appellate opinion 
affirming his conviction for DUI. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Stark with DUI. (R., pp. 8, 31-32.) The magistrate 
found Stark guilty after a trial. (R., p. 39.) Stark timely appealed to the district 
court. (R., pp. 44-45.) The district court affirmed on appeal, rejecting a claim 
that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient to support his conviction. (R., pp. 
175-84.) Stark timely appealed from the district court's order. (R., pp. 186-88.) 
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ISSUES 
Stark states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the trial court err in finding Mr. Stark guilty of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs or Intoxicating Substances 
when breath and blood tests conclusively proved that there were no 
intoxicating substances in the Defendant's system at the time he 
was driving? 
When the State chooses to rely upon the presence of a 
substance that is not intoxicating in and of itself, to prove guilt of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs or Intoxicating 
Substances, is expert testimony required to establish substantial, 
competent evidence of intoxicating substances and their connection 
to impairment, which was absent in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Stark failed to show that the evidence of his guilt is insufficient to 
sustain his conviction for DUI? 
2. Is Stark's argument that testimony from a drug recognition expert is a 
prerequisite to conviction for driving under the influence of drugs without merit 




Stark Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Of His Guilt Is Insufficient To 
Sustain His Conviction For DUI 
A. Introduction 
Stark contends the evidence of his guilt is insufficient to support his 
conviction, asserting the blood test is conclusive evidence that he was not under 
the influence of an intoxicating sUbstance. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) This 
argument is without merit. Review of the totality of the evidence under the 
applicable legal standards shows Stark has failed to demonstrate error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kL 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kL (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
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An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction if there is 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 131 
Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 
570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 
1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the fact finder as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 
121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d 
at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. The Evidence Supports The Verdict 
It is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle "under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs 
and/or any other intoxicating substances." I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). "Idaho Code § 
18-8004 does not require that a driver have a certain quantity of drugs in his or 
her system in order to be guilty of driving under the influence." State v. Lesley, 
133 Idaho 23, 26, 981 P.2d 748,751 (Ct. App. 1999). Rather, the statute "allows 
prosecution for use of drugs other than alcohol if other competent evidence" 
indicates drugs have compromised "the individual's ability to safely operate a 
vehicle." State v. Barker, 123 Idaho 162, 164, 845 P.2d 580, 582 (Ct. App. 
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1992). In this case there was ample competent evidence that Stark was driving 
under the influence of drugs.1 
Officer Ellis testified that he stopped Stark for driving the wrong way on a 
one-way street. (Tr., p. 11, L. 6 - p. 12, L. 17.) Stark's first words to the officer 
were "fuck off," with a demand that the officer "quit harassing him." (Tr., p. 12, 
Ls. 3-5.) Stark had trouble answering the officer's questions, and repeatedly told 
him "no" when the officer requested his driver's license. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 4-10.) 
Stark continued to be "uncooperative" and "belligerent" throughout the encounter, 
repeatedly refusing to follow the officer's commands. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-16; p. 14, 
Ls. 4-13; p. 19, Ls. 13-25.) His head was continually drooped to his chest and it 
appeared he was having trouble controlling his neck muscles. (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 8-
17.) He appeared dazed, almost as if he were sleeping, and his pupils were 
dilated. (Tr., p. 15, L. 18 - p. 16, L. 6.) 
Stark failed all field sobriety tests administered. (Tr., p. 16, L. 16 - p. 23, 
L. 24.) After his arrest, in a search incident thereto, the officer found a portion of 
a plastic bag consistent with drug packaging. (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-11.) When a drug 
recognition expert attempted further testing Stark told him to "fuck off' and 
refused to cooperate. (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 4-18.) 
1 At one point Stark claims that the state had to prove he was under the influence 
of a drug "by an analysis of blood." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) It is clear from the 
statutory language and from the cited case law that the state must establish only 
an alcohol concentration of .08 by testing (the "per se" theory), and may establish 
that the defendant is under the influence of alcohol or drugs (the "under the 
influence" theory) by any evidence. I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a); State v. Lesley, 133 
Idaho 23,26,981 P.2d 748, 751 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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Officer Ellis arranged a blood test, the results of which were admitted at 
trial. (Tr., p. 26, L. 19 - p. 28, L. 1.) The test was positive for carboxy-THC, 
which is associated with marijuana use. (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 2-6; State's Exhibit 1.) 
The state also admitted the audiotape of the encounter. (Tr., p. 28, L. 7 - p. 29, 
L. 2.) 
This evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Stark turned the 
wrong way on a one-way street. His immediate belligerence, claim of 
harassment, and refusal to follow instructions was unusual and irrational. He 
appeared physically impaired (drowsy and unable to control his neck muscles). 
His refusal to cooperate with drug-specific field sobriety testing is indicative of 
consciousness of guilt. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 556 (1983) 
("evidence of refusal to take a potentially incriminating test is similar to other 
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as escape from custody 
and suppression of evidence"); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 514-515, 65 
P.3d 534, 536-537 (Ct. App. 2003). Finally, his blood test was positive for 
carboxy-THC, which is associated with marijuana use. Together this evidence is 
sufficient to sustain the magistrate's verdict that Stark was under the influence of 
one or more drugs. 
Stark's primary argument is that there "was no evidence of any drug in Mr. 
Stark's blood stream" because the carboxy-THC in the blood test is a metabolite 
and not the actual intoxicant in marijuana. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) Stark's 
basic premise is true-carboxy-THC is not the intoxicant itself but is a metabolite 
processed by the liver when marijuana is used. See Reisenauer v. Dep't. of 
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Transp., 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008). His extrapolation from this initial 
premise that the test is "positive proof that Mr. Stark was not driving under the 
influence of intoxicating drugs" (Appellant's brief, p. 7) defies logic and the law. 
First, although it does not by itself establish that Stark was under the 
influence of marijuana, the presence of a metabolite produced by the body when 
marijuana is used makes it more likely, not less likely, that Stark was under the 
influence of marijuana. Although the test did not alone establish whether Stark's 
marijuana use was recent such that he was still under its influence, it certainly did 
not establish that he was not under the influence of marijuana. 
Second, although the only positive result of the test was carboxy-THe 
there was no reason to believe that the test was so universal as to exclude all 
other possible illegal or legal drugs or intoxicating substances that might have 
affected Stark's ability to drive. Stark's assumption that the test excluded all 
other possible sources of intoxication is simply unwarranted. 
The state did not have to prove exactly what intoxicant Stark was under 
the influence of; it had only to prove he was under the influence. His driving, 
behavior, demeanor, possession of apparent drug paraphernalia, test indicating 
marijuana metabolites, and consciousness of guilt cumulatively support the 
inference he was under the influence, and therefore is substantial, competent 
evidence supporting the guilty verdict. 
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II. 
Stark's Claim That Testimony From A Drug Recognition Expert Was A 
Prerequisite To His Conviction Is Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
Stark asserts that expert testimony from a drug recognition expert ("ORE") 
is a necessary prerequisite for the state to carry its burden of proof. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 9-14.) This argument is without merit because it was not preserved at 
the initial appeal to the district court, because such a rule is without merit on its 
face, and because Stark has presented no legal authority supporting adoption of 
such a rule. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). 
C. The Argument That ORE Testimony Is A Legal Prerequisite To Conviction 
For Driving Under The Influence Of Drugs Is Neither Preserved Nor 
Meritorious 
Stark's argument that ORE testimony is a legal prerequisite to conviction 
for driving under the influence of drugs is not preserved for review by this Court. 
The district court in its appellate capacity concluded that this issue was not 
preserved because it was not raised until Stark's reply brief. (R., p. 182.) It is 
well settled that an appellate court "will not consider arguments raised for the first 
time in the appellant's reply brief." Indian Springs, LLC v. Andersen, _ Idaho 
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_, _ P.3d _, 2012 WL 4055340, *7 (Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting Myers v. 
Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004». 
Because the issue was not preserved in the initial appeal it may not be 
addressed in this appeal. 
Stark contends that the issue is a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised" in his 
overall issue of insufficiency of the evidence. (Appellant's brief, p. 9 n.1 (citing 
I.A.R. 35 (a)(4».) However, the reason for this rule is because the arguments 
and authority presented in the initial brief are those "to which the respondent has 
an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief." & (quoting Suitts v. Nix, 
141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005». Stark in his reply brief argued, 
for the first time on appeal, that "Idaho should adopt a rule that ORE testimony is 
required in cases such as this one." (R., p. 151; see also Appellant's brief, p. 
13.) Advocacy for a hard and fast rule that ORE testimony is a prerequisite to 
conviction is not an issue fairly comprised within a general argument that the 
evidence was insufficient. The state was deprived of the opportunity to brief 
before the district court in the initial appeal Stark's claim that it necessarily had to 
present testimony from a ORE to prove its case. Because Stark has failed to 
show that the state should or even could have concluded that whether ORE 
testimony is a prerequisite to conviction was an issue on appeal, he has failed to 
show the issue is a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised" in the issue raised in his 
brief. He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
claim on this basis. 
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Stark's argument also fails on the merits. First, Stark's argument that 
ORE testimony is required for conviction is hypocritically self-serving in light of 
his ineloquent refusal to cooperate with the ORE. (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 4-18.) Allowing 
drivers under the influence of drugs to avoid conviction by the simple expedient 
of telling the ORE to "fuck off" is obviously absurd. 
Second, Stark's argument that "Idaho courts should adopt a rule that ORE 
testimony is required in cases such as this one, especially in the face of a 
negative [sic] blood test" (Appellant's brief, p. 13 (footnote omitted)) is 
unsupported by any law whatsoever. Arguments unsupported by legal authority 
will not be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 
966, 970 (1996). Stark has cited to no authority from any jurisdiction that in any 
context has made expert testimony an absolute prerequisite to a criminal 
conviction. Nor has he stated any legal basis for making this case the first. 
Finally, Stark's argument that the patrol officer "was simply not qualified to 
render any opinions concerning drugs and intoxicating substances, or their 
effects on the human body relating to impaired driving" (Appellant's brief, p. 10) is 
without merit under applicable legal standards. To the extent Stark is 
complaining about the admission of the testimony of the patrol officer regarding 
Stark being under the influence, such objection was not preserved below. State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) ("Generally Idaho's 
appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an 
objection at triaL"). To the extent Stark is complaining about the weight to be 
given to the patrol officer's testimony, such is also an improper and meritless 
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argument. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 
1997) (appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence). 
The reason that no ORE evidence was presented in this case is because 
Stark told the ORE to "fuck off." His argument that this entitles him to an acquittal 
is meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision 
of the district court affirming Stark's conviction for DUI. 
DATED this 2nd day of October 20 2. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of October, 2012, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
THOMAS B. DOMINICK 
BOBBIE K. DOMINICK 
Dominick Law Offices, PLLC 
500 W. Bannock 
Boise, 1083702 
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